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Abstract
An industry is modeled in which entrepreneurs, who are heterogeneous
in ability, may produce formally or informally. Two cases are distinguished,
with and without labour market segmentation, for which di¤erent patterns
of formal/informal supply obtain. Without segmentation, informality may
generate production where otherwise there would be none. Typically, how-
ever, a trade-o¤ obtains: when informality makes output higher it cuts the
prot of the most able entrepreneurs, potentially damaging growth. With
segmentation, informality causes some replacement of goodjobs by bad,
and total employment may be a¤ected in either direction; without segmen-
tation the e¤ect on total employment is weakly positive. (JEL: O17, D2)
1 Introduction
The widespread existence of informality in developing economies is commonly
viewed as having detrimental economic and social e¤ects.1 This negative eval-
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1Widely cited gures, taken from SCHNEIDER AND ENSTE [2000], put informal
output in developing economies at about 40% of GDP, and informal employment at
about 60% of total employment. A more recent gure given by SCHNEIDER [2006]
is that the shadow economyconstitutes 38.7% of GDP, on average, for 96 developing
economies.
uation is partly the result of a focus on the labour market, which is seen as seg-
mented, that is, with, at a given skill level, formal jobs being more attractive than
informal jobs, but access to formal jobs being rationed (FIELDS [2009]). It is
reinforced by evidence that informal rms are less e¢ cient than formal ones (DE
PAULA AND SCHEINKMAN [2008]). However, an alternative view, developed
in the Latin American context, suggests that the labour market may not be seg-
mented and that there may be dynamic benets from informality. In particular,
MALONEY [2004] argues that at least part of the informal sector involves volun-
tary employment and self-employment, and is the analogue of the entrepreneurial
small-rm sector found in developed countries, where it is an engine of growth (see
also BENNETT [2010]). Empirical evidence on whether there is informal/formal
labour market segmentation is mixed, with conclusions di¤ering signicantly both
across countries and across sectors within countries (see, e.g., BADAOUI ET AL.
[2008]).
The present paper aims to further understanding of the impact of informality by
formulating a model of the product market side, which has been little explored in
the theoretical literature. We examine how the pattern of informality/formality in
an industry depends on whether the labour market is segmented, as well as on the
distribution of entrepreneurial abilities, the strength of product demand and para-
meters a¤ecting the net costs and benets of informality. We use this framework to
examine various issues related to the welfare impact of informality. Throughout,
we consider a production activity in which formality-versus-informality is an active
choice for an entrepreneur. Our analysis is not meant to apply to the lower tier of
informal activity, which has low value added, often only involving resale, with low
capital-intensity and almost no paid employment. Rather, it relates to informal
activity that can make prot, is more capital-intensive, involves paid employment
and may entail competition with formal rms.
We assume that, unlike an informal rm, a formal rm must bear a registration
cost. If the labour market is unsegmented, all rms pay the same money wage.
If there is segmentation, however, formal rms additionally provide workers with
social benets (an alternative interpretation is that a formal rm pays a statutory
minimum wage rate, while an informal rm pays a lower, market, wage rate).2 In
the terminology of BOURGUIGNON [2005], when there is segmentation, formal
jobs are goodand informal jobs bad. We assume, however, that a formal rm
obtains a productivity benet from greater access to public services, including legal
2There is no generally agreed way to dene informality, though lack of registration by
the rm is included in most denitions. The two approaches commonly taken are also
to specify that (a) the rm does not provide social security benets; or (b) the rm does
not exceed some employment size threshold. E.g., denition (a) has been used by the
South African government and (b) by the Moroccan one (WALTHER AND FILIPIAK
[2007]). We use (a) in this paper.
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protection and contract enforcement, that may be unavailable to an informal rm
(STRAUB [2005]; AMARAL AND QUINTIN [2006]).
In practice, formality is also strongly associated with larger size: formal regula-
tions may only apply to larger rms (see AHSAN AND PAGES [2007] on India)
and, more generally, an entrepreneur operating informally may eschew expansion
because of the risk of attracting the attention of the authorities (WORLD BANK
[2007]). We reect these considerations as simply as possible by assuming that
for each entrepreneur only two levels of output are feasible. Fear of discovery and
associated penalties are assumed su¢ ciently strong entirely to deter informality
at the higher of these levels, and so informality occurs only at the lower one; but,
because of increasing returns, if an entrepreneur chooses to operate formally, he
or she chooses the higher level.
We di¤erentiate entrepreneurs in terms of ability, through a multiplicative pa-
rameter on labour requirements. Given the formality-informality status chosen
by an entrepreneur, greater entrepreneurial ability is associated with a lower total
labour cost.3 To determine the e¤ect of informality, we compare the industry equi-
librium when each entrepreneur is free to choose either formality or informality
(or to stay out), with one in which informality is ruled out.
If only formal production were possible the number of entrepreneurs that could
produce protably would be non-decreasing in price, and so the supply curve
of output would be (weakly) positively sloped. When the option of operating
informally is added into this picture, the choice between formality and informality
for each entrepreneur must also be taken into account. At any potential price
each entrepreneur weighs the productivity benet and the potential prots that
would come from the larger scale of formal production against the registration cost
and, if there is segmentation, the higher unit labour cost that formality involves.
Each entrepreneur views this comparison through the lens of his or her own ability,
through its e¤ect on total labour costs.
We develop the model rst with labour market segmentation, and then with-
out it. In each case we assume that parameter values are such that, depending on
product demand, there may be a mix of formality and informality in equilibrium.
This leads us to make di¤erent assumptions regarding the size of registration costs
in the two cases. When there is segmentation, unit labour costs are greater for
formality than informality for any given entrepreneur. For formality to be a viable
option at least for some entrepreneurs at some level of demand, the net e¤ect of
some other factors must favour formality su¢ ciently. Thus, for segmentation, we
3The analysis is not a¤ected substantively if capital costs, as well as, or instead of,
labour costs are assumed to depend on an entrepreneurs ability. The idea behind our
specic formulation is that a piece of equipment costs the same to an entrepreneur
irrespective of his or her ability; but the cost of operating the equipment will be less for
a more able entrepreneur.
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formulate our analysis in terms of the registration cost being less than a criti-
cal value, relative to the assumed productivity and scale advantages of formality.4
However, in the absence of segmentation, unit labour costs are the same for formal-
ity and informality, and so, since formal production has a productivity advantage
and occurs at a greater scale, informality would never be chosen unless the regis-
tration cost were su¢ ciently large. For this case we assume that the registration
cost exceeds the critical value mentioned above.5
Consider the segmentation case. When price is relatively low, the productivity
and scale advantages of formality are correspondingly small. Since, by assumption,
the registration cost is also small, entrepreneurs of a su¢ ciently high ability (for
whom the absolute di¤erence in total labour costs from producing formally rather
than informally is relatively small) choose formality. Therefore, when product
demand is relatively low, output is only formal, all coming from high-ability en-
trepreneurs. When product demand is higher, these entrepreneurs will, a fortiori,
produce formally, but less able entrepreneurs also enter production. The more
able of these additional entrants choose formality, but their production is supple-
mented by some informal entry by the less able. The latter entrepreneurs nd
informality the more protable because, for them, the absolute di¤erence in total
labour costs from producing formally rather than informally is large. However, if
product demand is so high that all available entrepreneurs have entered produc-
tion, any further rises in demand are met by a switch of the less able entrepreneurs
from informality to formality, to take advantage of the high product price through
the scale and productivity benets that formality involves. For a su¢ ciently high
demand, all produce formally.
In the no-segmentation case, the registration cost is the only disadvantage of
formality for an entrepreneur. However, at a relatively low price, the productivity
and scale benets of formality are relatively small, and so, with the registration
cost su¢ ciently high, informality is preferred to formality, yielding a positive prot
for the most able entrepreneurs. Hence, in contrast to the segmentation case, when
product demand is relatively low, only informal production occurs. However, as
product demand increases, informal production is steadily displaced by formal
production. As price rises, the most able entrepreneurs, who at a low price operate
informally, nd that paying the registration cost and switching to formality is
justied by the increased revenue that the associated greater scale of production
4We could alternatively have formulated the analysis in terms of the critical level of
the productivity benet, given any level of the registration cost.
5Two other potential cases are segmentation together with a high registration cost
and no-segmentation with a low registration. We do not consider the former case sep-
arately because it turns out to be a special case, analytically, of the segmentation-low
registration cost formulation. We disregard the latter case entirely because it would
result in informality never being chosen.
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brings in. Again, when product demand is su¢ ciently high, all output is formal.
We go on to develop the model for a uniform distribution of entrepreneurial
ability to obtain more detailed results. With and without segmentation, having
the option of informality available to entrepreneurs can result in higher or lower
total output (we specify the conditions). In particular, without segmentation there
is a range of product demand for which some informal production occurs, whereas
if informality were not possible there would be no production. Thus, informality
can be welfare-enhancing. With the exception of this case, however, a trade-o¤ is
found: with or without segmentation, if having the option of informality causes
output (and consumer surplus) to be greater, it is also found that the prots earned
by the more able entrepreneurs are made smaller, and vice versa. If we suppose that
investment by the more able entrepreneurs is important for the growth prospects of
the industry, this implies that when informality is benecial in terms of production
it has a potentially adverse e¤ect with regard to growth prospects.
With segmentation, the existence of informality as an option may a¤ect the
total number of jobs positively or negatively; but in either event, good jobs are
destroyed - if the e¤ect is positive it is because more bad jobs are created than
good ones lost. Without segmentation, however, at low product demand, jobs are
created where otherwise there would be none, while at higher product demand,
jobs in informal rms displace jobs in formal rms on a one-for-one basis; that is,
without segmentation, there is never a reduction in the total number of jobs.
Thus, our analysis suggests that, for given parameter values, there are poten-
tially some positive aspects of informality, and so, given the widespread market
imperfections in developing economies, (possibly tacit) support of informality may
in some circumstances be seen as an appropriate second-best response. However,
we end by considering comparative statics briey, and, we show, in particular, that,
with and without segmentation, a reduction in the registration cost is welfare en-
hancing (we disregard the use to which government income from registration costs
may be put). Without segmentation, if the registration cost is reduced to zero
there will be no informality; but when there is segmentation a zero registration
cost may, depending on the level of demand, leave some informality in equilibrium.
In the theoretical literature on informality, heterogeneity of entrepreneurial
ability was introduced by RAUCH [1991], using a variation of the LUCAS [1978]
model in which ability is represented by a multiplicative parameter on output.
He thereby explains why a missing middlein the size distribution of rms may
obtain. Our formulation shares with Rauch the assumption of a minimum wage
rate (or, equivalently, social benet provision) only in the formal sector, though
we characterize entrepreneurial ability di¤erently; and, at the cost of suppressing
the endogenous choice of size for each rm that Rauch analyzes, we are able to
examine in detail the product market and welfare ramications.
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Various authors have analysed informality using the Lucas-Rauch formula-
tion of entrepreneurial ability. These include FORTIN ET AL. [1997], who
generate a gap in the size distribution of rms as a result of expenditure by
informal rms on avoiding detection, and AMARAL AND QUINTIN [2006],
who endogenize skills by developing an overlapping-generations model with oc-
cupational choice. Other building blocks of our model are also common in the
literature, including higher wage rates paid by formal than by informal rms
(e.g., GOLDBERG AND PAVCNIK [2003]) and the productivity benet of for-
mality (e.g., AMARAL AND QUINTIN [2006]). Factors that we do not in-
clude but which are also found in the literature include value-added taxation (DE
PAULA AND SCHEINKMAN [2008]), di¤erential cost of or access to outside
nance (STRAUB [2005]; ANTUNES AND CAVALCANTI [2007]) and bribery
(IHRIG AND MOE [2004]). A paper that, like ours, is concerned with the prod-
uct market, is that of BANERJI AND JAIN [2007]. However, their focus is
di¤erent, examining the endogenous di¤erences in the quality of output between
informal and formal rms.
There is also a literature that uses search-and-matching theory to analyse in-
formality, based on the assumption that workers, rather than entrepreneurs, are
heterogeneous in ability. For example, BOSCH [2007] assumes that workers are
ex ante homogeneous, but, when brought together with rms, some matches are
more productive than others, while ALBRECHT ET AL. [2009] develop a model
in which ability-di¤erences between workers a¤ect their productivities if they are
in formal jobs, but not if they are in informal ones. Because of the complexity of
these models it is usually necessary to use simulations to obtain specic results.
A recent contribution by ULYSSEA [2010], for example, uses Brazilian data and
nds that lower entry costs to the formal sector are a particularly e¤ective policy,
resulting in greater formal employment and lower total unemployment.
In Section 2 the model is set up, while the next two sections examine the impli-
cations for the formal-informal mix - in Section 3 with labour market segmentation
and in Section 4 without it. Section 5 gives further discussion of welfare-related
aspects of informality. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are given in an appendix.
2 The Model
Consider a competitive industry, with free entry, producing a homogeneous good.
A pool of entrepreneurs exists for this industry, each of whom may choose to run
a rm with informal status, or with formal status, or to stay out of production.
Running one rm requires an entrepreneurs full attention. A rm is a price-taker
in the product and input markets. To allow for heterogeneity of entrepreneurial
abilities, a cost coe¢ cient  (> 0) is attached to each entrepreneur, where  varies
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across entrepreneurs. A lower value of  reects higher entrepreneurial ability (we
refer to an entrepreneur with a given  as a -entrepreneur).6 A -entrepreneur
faces a Leontief technology, with two scales of activity being possible. The larger
scale involves twice as large an input package as the smaller does.
However, informality at the larger scale is ruled out because the combination
of risk of discovery and potential penalties is too large to bear. If a -entrepreneur
chooses informality, his or her rm operates at the smaller scale, earning prot
I = p  w  k. (1)
k units of capital are employed along with  units of labour to produce one unit
of output. p is the unit price of output; w is the wage rate and the unit price of
capital is set at unity.
Instead, an entrepreneur may choose formal status, for which there are several
costs and benets not found with informality. On the cost side, the entrepreneur
must pay a registration cost c. Also, for each unit of labour employed, as well as
the wage w, a rm with formal status must provide social benets at the cost s per
worker. With s > 0 the labour market is segmented, which we assume in Section
3, while the unsegmented case (s = 0) is examined in Section 4. On the benet
side, it is assumed that, per package of labour and capital inputs, a formal rm
produces  units of output, rather than the single unit produced by an informal
rm. This may be because formal rms gain superior access to public goods such
as public infrastructure, contract enforcement and property rights.
Given these assumptions, formality is associated with increasing returns to
scale (the coe¢ cient  can be also interpreted as a purely technological returns-
to-scale parameter) and so, if a -entrepreneur decides to produce formally, it will
be at the larger scale, prot being given by
F = 2[p  (w + s)  k]  c;  > 1. (2)
Note that the -coe¢ cient applies to an entrepreneur regardless of whether formal
or informal status is adopted.
We denote the opportunity cost for a -entrepreneur of running a rm (in the
industry we analyse) by 0, which, for simplicity, is assumed independent of .7
Using (1) and (2), we shall plot the loci for I = 0, F = 0 and F = I in (; p)-
space. We note here for reference the (; p)-combination, denoted by (; p), at
6Thus, in contrast to LUCAS [1978] and RAUCH [1991], but similarly to
JOVANOVIC [1982], we model di¤erences in ability through a multiplicative para-
meter on costs (see PARKER [2004] for discussion of this issue).
7RAUCH [1991] assumes that 0 is the wage an entrepreneur could make as a worker.
If we had assumed that 0 is increasing in , i.e., that greater entrepreneurial ability
in the industry we analyze implies a greater value in alternative uses, then the loci in
Figure 1 would diminish in slope as  increases.
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which I = F = 0, informality and formality each just breaking even:
 =
c^  c
2(s  s^) ; p
 =
2sk + (2s+ w)0   cw
2(s  s^) , where (3)
s^ = (   1)w; (4)
c^ = 2(   1)k + (2   1)0. (5)
The role played by informality depends critically on whether s T s^ and/or c T c^.
A necessary condition for informality possibly to be chosen by some entrepreneurs
is that at least one of c > c^ and s > s^, i.e., at least one of the costs of formality
is above the specied critical value. Given (4), if s > s^ then s > 0, the labour
market being segmented.
Note that s T s^ is equivalent to (w + s)= T w, where, for a given ,
(w + s)= is the labour cost of a unit of output for formality and w that for
informality. In practice, a variety of factors inuence which of these labour costs is
the greater. Formal labour cost per unit of output will be relatively high if formal
rms pay rents to workers. TEAL [1996] nds strong evidence of rent sharing
with workers by formal manufacturing rms in Ghana, and he concludes that the
30% di¤erential between formal and informal sectors conjectured by LEWIS [1954]
for his seminal two-sector model is a substantial underestimate. Also, COLLIER
AND GUNNING [1999] suggest that in some African countries governments may
generate rents for formal rms on the implicit understanding that the rms will
pay high wage rates to workers. Informal labour cost per unit of output may
be relatively low if informal rms provide benets that cost little but are greatly
valued by workers. For example, informal rms may provide greater exibility of
hours, and family members may be employed without an explicit wage being paid
(see WORLD BANK [2007] on such behaviour in Latin America).8
DJANKOV ET AL. [2002] nd, across 85 countries at various levels of devel-
opment, an average o¢ cial registration cost of 47% of annual per capita GDP. If
we take this gure as a stylized fact for our model, then, from (5), su¢ cient for
c < c^, as we shall assume in Section 3, would be that 0 exceed 47% of annual per
capita GDP. However, Djankov et al. also nd that the o¢ cial registration cost is
much higher in some countries, being above 100% of annual per capital GDP in 9
of their sample, the highest being 460% in the Dominican Republic. This suggests
that a group of countries may exist with c > c^, as we assume in Section 4.
8For simplicity, we do not allow for the costs of capital being di¤erent for informal
than for formal rms. If capital is more expensive for informal rms because of lack of
access to formal sources of nance, so that they use moneylenders, it becomes less likely
that the appropriately amended version of (4) will be satised. However, informal rms
may get the capital from family and friends. In Africa the interest rate for such loans
is typically at or near zero. E.g., in Ghana, LA FERRARA [2003] nds a real interest
rate of approximately zero within kin groups.
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Let min and max denote the respective lowest and highest values of  in
the pool of entrepreneurs. If only minimal entrepreneurial skills are required in
the industry this pool may be large relative to the number that would satisfy
product demand at any price. Then the supply of entrepreneurs would never
impose a binding constraint on total output and, with a great enough heterogeneity
of abilities, max may be so large that we can treat it as innite. Alternatively,
a binding nite upper bound on  may exist because the entrepreneurial skills
the industry requires are relatively scarce. We focus on the latter case because a
similar e¤ect on the results will obtain even if the entrepreneurial skills are not
scarce, but a complementary input is rationed.
3 A Segmented Labour Market
For this section we assume that s > s^ and c < c^. With s > s^, the labour market
is segmented, while the inequality c < c^ is assumed to hold so that there may be
a mix of formality and informality in equilibrium. It is found from (3) that, with
these assumptions,  > 0 and p > 0, the loci for I = 0, F = 0 and F = I
being as shown in Figure 1.9
[Figure 1]
The region in which formality is chosen is labelled F, with light shading; that
in which informality is chosen is labelled I, with dark shading; that in which the
entrepreneur stays out is labelled 0, and is unshaded. For (; p)-combinations
above (below) the F = I locus, F >(<) I . Above (below) the I = 0 locus,
I >(<) 0, and similarly for the F = 0 locus. Hence, F is chosen for (; p)
above both the F = I and F = 0 loci. I is chosen for (; p) below the F = I
locus but above the I = 0 locus. For (; p) below both the F = 0 and I = 0
loci an entrepreneur stays out of the industry.
We adopt the following notation for critical values of :
I() = F () when (p) =
(2   1)p  k   c
w + 2s
 (p); (6)
I() = 0() when (p) =
p  k   0
w
 I(p); (7)
F () = 0() when (p) =
p  k   (c+ 0)=2
w + s
 F (p). (8)
9If we were to assume that c  c^, as well as s > s^, the loci would not intersect within
the positive quadrant. Then the relevant gure would be the same, in e¤ect, as the part
of Figure 1 to the right of  = . Our analysis in this section therefore covers this
possibility.
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We shall also refer to the inverse functions of (6)-(8). The p at which, for a given
, I = F , is written p(); the p at which, for a given , I = 0, is written
pI(); and the p at which, for a given , F = 0, is written pF ().
By extending a horizontal line through any price p in Figure 1 we can see
the range of -values associated with informality, formality, or staying out of the
industry for that level of p. Thus we can determine for each possible price p the
total supplies of output produced informally and formally.
We express total supply (and, later, demand) as per entrepreneur in the pool.
The cumulative density of  is denoted by G(), and the supply of output by
informal and by formal rms, per entrepreneur, by qIs(p) and q
F
s (p), respectively,
and total supply per entrepreneur is qs(p) = qIs(p) + q
F
s (p). For brevity, we shall
henceforth omit the phrase per entrepreneur. To keep the language simple the
results will be stated for a continuous -distribution. The following proposition
characterizes the formal, informal and total supply curves.
Proposition 1 Informal and formal supply in a segmented labour market. As-
sume s > s^, c < c^ and  2 [min; max]. Then (a) for p 2 [0; pF (min)) supply is
zero; (b) for p 2 [pF (min); p] supply is only formal and is increasing in p; (c) for
p 2 (p; p(max)] supply is a mix of formality and informality and is increasing in
p; (d) for p 2 (p(max);1) supply is all formal and is constant.
Thus, above the minimum price p = pF (min) that induces entry, three p-ranges
can be distinguished: a lowp (range (b)) is associated with formality only; an
intermediatep (range (c)) is associated with a formal-informal mix; and a high
p (range (d)) is associated with formality only. We now turn to the intuition.
In the low p-range (b), entry is protable for an entrepreneur with su¢ ciently
low . The impact of a low  on total labour costs is greater for formality, which
uses more labour at a higher unit cost, than for informality, and is reinforced by
the productivity benet  and the larger size (and so, potentially, ability to make
prot) of formality. Thus, only formal production occurs, with only the relatively
able entrepreneurs producing. Given that c < c^, the registration cost c of formality
is not so great as to prevent this outcome.
In the intermediate p-range (c), production also becomes protable for entre-
preneurs who do not have such a low . Of those producing when p is in this
range, those with a lower  choose formality for the reason outlined above. But
those with a higher  prefer informality because a higher  magnies total labour
costs and so has a greater negative impact on the prot that would obtain from
formal than from informal status. This outweighs the benets that would accrue
from formality - from greater scale and from . Thus there is a mix of formality
and informality, and as p rises within range (c), entrepreneurs with a relatively
high  become able to obtain a prot from entering production informally. At the
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same time, as p rises entrepreneurs near the margin of choice between formality
and informality steadily switch from informality to formality because the p rise
increases the benets from greater scale and from .
In the high p-range (d) all entrepreneurs have entered production and the switch
from informality to formality is complete. If p is raised above p(max) there is no
e¤ect on output: all entrepreneurs are already producing formally.
To derive specic supply curves we assume that the distribution of  is uniform,
with mean  and upper and lower bounds   ( >  > 0), where    <  <
+. Thus,   = min and + = max and the cumulative density function is
G() = (   + )=2 for  2 [  ; + ]. The following corollary summarizes
the impact that the existence of the option of informality has on total supply.
Corollary 1 With s > s^ and c < c^, suppose   U [  ; + ]. The e¤ect that
the option of informality has on total supply is positive for p 2 (p; ~p), but negative
for p 2 (p^; p(max)), where p = ~p solves (2   1)G[(p)] + 1 = 2G[F (p)]. For p
outside these ranges it has no e¤ect on total supply.
The e¤ect that the option of informality has on total output depends on the
interaction of this supply e¤ect with demand. In Figure 2, qFs (p), as shown by the
thick line TVR, denotes what supply would be if informality were ruled out. This
is upward sloping until point V (p = pF (max)), where all of the pool of entrepre-
neurs are operating formally, supply then being vertical. However, if informality
is an option, it is exercised by some entrepreneurs when the demand curve cuts
qFs (p) between Z and Y. Then, formal supply q
F
s (p) is shown by ZY, aggregate
supply qFs (p) + q
I
s(p) is TZWYR, and informal supply q
I
s(p) is the horizontal dif-
ference between the two. The vertical distance between Z and Y is p-range (c) in
Proposition 1.
[Figure 2]
Since Corollary 1 and Figure 2 are a special case of Proposition 1, the expla-
nation already given still applies. However, the uniform distribution has its own
properties. We know from Proposition 1 that as p rises from p some entrepreneurs
switch from informality to formality (with a negative e¤ect on informal supply)
and some others switch from inactivity to informality (with a positive e¤ect on in-
formal supply). Thus, there are conicting e¤ects on informal supply, but we were
not able to tell, for the general case, which e¤ect was the greater. However, with
a uniform distribution the positive e¤ect dominates (the horizontal gap between
qFs (p) and q
F
s (p) + q
I
s(p) increases as we move up from Z to W) and so informal, as
well as formal, supply is increasing in p. When p is raised from pI(max) there are
no additional entrepreneurs available to produce informally and so qIs(p) declines,
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but because of the switch to formality explained above, qFs (p) rises by more than
qIs(p) declines. Informal supply decreases between W and Y, where all supply is
formal.
Combining this characterization of the supply side with a demand curve for
output, we have that, in Figure 2, the impact of having informality as an option
is that if the demand curve intersects qFs (p) between Z and X, output is made
greater, while if it intersects between X and Y output is made smaller.
4 An Unsegmented Labour Market
We now examine how the analysis is a¤ected if s = 0, so that the labour market
is not segmented. We interpret this as formal rms paying no social benets. It
may instead be interpreted as the absence of a binding minimum wage for formal
employment or, equivalently, it may be supposed that both types of rms pay social
benets so as to compete in the labour market (see WORLD BANK [2007]) with,
algebraically, social benets incorporated into w. There are now no good jobs or
bad jobs: all jobs are identical. For there possibly to be any informality, it is
necessary that c > c^, which we now assume. Since the results for s = 0 are the
same, qualitatively, as for any s 2 [0; s^), our results also cover the case of a small
amount of segmentation. The prot loci are shown in Figure 3 (note that the
values of p and  are di¤erent to in the segmentation case). The choices made
by entrepreneurs are labelled and shaded as in Figure 1.
[Figure 3]
Parallel to Proposition 1 we obtain the following.
Proposition 2 Informal and formal supply in an unsegmented labour market.
Assume s = 0, c > c^ and  2 [min; max]. Then (a) for p 2 [0; pI(min)) supply
is zero; (b) for p 2 [pI(min); p(min)] supply is only informal and is increasing in
p; (c) for p 2 (p(min); p] supply is a mix of formality and informality; formal
and total supply are increasing in p but informal supply is decreasing in p; (d) for
p 2 (p;1) supply is all formal, increasing in p up to p = pF (max), and then
constant.
Thus, above the minimum price p = pI(min) that induces entry, three p-ranges
can be distinguished: a lowp (range (b)) is associated with informality only; an
intermediatep (range (c)) is associated with a formal-informal mix; and a high
p (range (d)) is associated with formality only. We now turn to the intuition.
As in the segmented case, at a low p entry is only protable for low- entrepre-
neurs; but in the present case they enter informally, whereas with segmentation
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they entered formally. This di¤erence between Propositions 1 and 2 stems from
the di¤ering assumptions regarding both s and c. Because of the role of the pro-
ductivity parameter , when s = 0 the labour cost of producing a unit of output
is less for formality than for informality, and the scale e¤ect of formality magnies
the associated prot. Nonetheless, when p is su¢ ciently low (range (b)), so that
the scale and productivity benets of formality are small, the large registration
cost makes formality unprotable - although entrepreneurs with a su¢ ciently low
 can nonetheless make a prot from informality.
When p is higher, in the intermediate range (c), the scale and productivity ben-
ets of formality are magnied. Even with the high registration cost, entrepreneurs
with su¢ ciently low  nd formality protable, and more so than informality. At
the same time, those with a somewhat higher , i.e., higher labour costs, cannot
prot from formality, but they can make a prot from informality because it has no
registration cost. Thus, the move from a low p to an intermediate one causes the
more able entrepreneurs to switch from informality to formality, as well as making
informality protable for the somewhat less able. There is a mix of formality and
informality.
In the high p-range (d) the switch is complete: all those who would have
produced informally at a p in range (b) or (c) now choose formality. When p
is higher within this range, the scale and productivity advantages of formality
are yet greater, and so more entrepreneurs enter, all choosing formality, until all
entrepreneurs are producing.
Corresponding to Corollary 1, we have the following:
Corollary 2 With s = 0 and c > c^, suppose   U [   ; + ]. The option
of informality has a positive impact on supply if p 2 (pI(min); px), but a negative
one if p 2 (px; p), where p = px 2 (pF (min); p(min)]. For p outside these ranges
it has no e¤ect on output.
This is illustrated in Figure 4, with qFs (p) (shown by VTS) again denoting
what supply would be in the absence of informality. The shape of the supply
curve qFs (p) + q
I
s(p) (YXWTS) reects Proposition 2 - the only additional feature
that the uniform-distribution example brings to the picture is linearity.
[Figure 4]
5 Further Discussion
Although expressions for the impact of the option of informality on total welfare,
both with and without segmentation, are intractable, we can gain insights into
the e¤ects on some aspects of welfare. We assume a uniform distribution of ,
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as specied above, and that the demand curve is downward-sloping and is located
such that, in Figure 2 or 4, as appropriate, there is some informality in equilibrium.
Thus, denoting by pF the price at which demand cuts qF (p), in Figure 2 demand
passes above Z and below Y, i.e., pF 2 (p; p(max)); in Figure 4 demand passes
above Y and below W, i.e., pF 2 (pI(min); p).
The impact on consumer surplus (CS) of informality being an option follows
from our previous results. When there is a positive (negative) impact on total
output, price falls (rises) and there is a positive (negative) impact on CS. Although
we cannot generally determine the impact of informality on aggregate prots, we
are able to examine the impact on the prots of relatively able entrepreneurs (e.g.,
for  = min). This may be important because the prots of these entrepreneurs
may have a signicant e¤ect on the quantity and quality of investment, and thus
on growth prospects. There is one case in which informality is unconditionally
benecial: without segmentation, if pF 2 (pI(min); pF (min)] we have both that
CS is raised (there is no production without informality) and the prot generated
goes to the more able entrepreneurs. However, for segmentation and for some
price ranges without segmentation a trade-o¤ obtains: when having the option of
informality increases CS, it reduces the prot of the more able entrepreneurs, and
vice versa.
Lemma 1 An intertemporal trade-o¤ from informality. If   U [   ; +
] and the demand curve is downward sloping with, in equilibrium, some in-
formality, having the option of informality has the following e¤ects. (i) With
segmentation, if pF 2 (p; ~p), CS rises, but more able entrepreneurs get less
prot; if pF 2 (~p; p(max)), the reverse e¤ects hold. (ii) Without segmentation,
if pF 2 (pF (min); px), CS rises, but more able entrepreneurs get less prot; if
pF 2 (p(min); p), the reverse e¤ects hold.
In Figure 2 (with segmentation) if pF 2 (p; p(max)), low- entrepreneurs
produce formally regardless of whether informality is an option. However, when
informality is an option, the impact on total output is positive if pF 2 (p; ~p), so
that p is lower and CS higher, taking some prot away from the low- entrepre-
neurs; while if pF 2 (~p; p(max)) the opposite results obtain. Without segmentation
a similar argument applies. In Figure 4, if pF 2 (pF (min); px) low- entrepreneurs
produce informally when it is an option, but formally otherwise, with, in the
former case, total supply being greater and so p lower. Therefore the low- en-
trepreneurs get less prot when informality is an option, but CS is then higher.
If pF 2 (p(min); p) low- entrepreneurs produce formally irrespective of whether
informality can be chosen; but when informality can be chosen total output is
lower and p is higher, so these entrepreneurs earn higher prots, whereas CS is
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lower.10
When informality is an option for entrepreneurs, the number and type of jobs
may also be a¤ected. With segmentation, if there is any informality in equilibrium,
the impact on the number of good jobs is negative, but the total number of jobs
may be a¤ected in either direction, the e¤ect being positive for a relatively low
p and negative for a relatively high one. Without segmentation, the e¤ect of
informality being an option is that the number of jobs increases at a relatively low
price, but is una¤ected at a relatively high one.
Proposition 3 The total employment e¤ect of informality. Suppose   U [  
; + ] and that there is some informality in equilibrium. (i) With segmentation,
having the option of informality raises the total number of jobs if pF 2 (p; ~pl)
but reduces it if pF 2 (~pl; p(max)), where ~pl 2 (pI(max); pF (max)]. (ii) Without
segmentation it raises the total number of jobs if p 2 (pI(min); p(min)) but has no
e¤ect on the total number of jobs if p 2 [p(min); p).
With segmentation, we have seen that the option of informality may a¤ect
output in either direction. In Figure 2, the output e¤ect is positive if the demand
curve passes between Z and X, but negative if it passes between X and Y. Propo-
sition 3(i) is the analogue of this result for total employment. Because, for any
, labour productivity is lower for informality than formality, it follows that if
qFs (p) + q
I
s(p)  qFs (p) (i.e., up to p = ~p in Figure 2) then lFs (p) + lIs(p) > lFs (p).
Therefore, the critical price, p = ~pl in Proposition 3, at which lFs (p)+l
I
s(p) =
lFs (p),
exceeds ~p. Without segmentation, a similar argument obtains, with the critical
value of p being p(min), but, for p above this value the total number of jobs is
the same with and without the option of informality.
The results above are obtained for given parameter values, but the parameters
s and c may be varied directly by government policy, with results as follows.11
Lemma 2 Reduced costs of formality. If   U [ ;+] a smaller registration
cost c or social benet cost s is (weakly) associated with greater total output and
employment both with and without labour market segmentation.
A lower level of c or s favours formality at the expense of informality, as would
be expected; but, as stated in Lemma 2, with a uniform distribution of ability,
10There is also one case in which CS is a¤ected by informality, but the e¤ect on
the prots of the most able is unclear. That is when there is no segmentation and
pF 2 (px; p(min)).
11The lemma is obtained by di¤erentiating the expressions for total output and em-
ployment in the proofs to Corollaries 1-2. Similarly, with and without segmentation,
lower values of s, w, k and 0 and a higher  are weakly associated with greater total
output and employment.
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the positive e¤ects on formal output and employment dominate, regardless of
whether there is segmentation. (Also, the prots of the most able entrepreneurs
rise.) Indeed, if we assume that government revenue from registration costs is not
used to enhance welfare, then, as also found by ULYSSEA [2010] in a search-
and-matching model of informality, a lower level of c is (weakly) associated with
greater welfare. (The same conclusion would only follow for a lower s if the lower
cost of providing social benets were not associated with a reduction in the utility
of social benets.) An implication of this argument is that c should be reduced
to zero. The e¤ects di¤er, however, depending on whether there is segmentation.
With segmentation, even if c = 0 our analysis in Section 3 still applies. Without
segmentation, when c  c^ informality disappears altogether.
Finally, the model is relevant to the debate on the cyclicality of informality. In
dual labour market (segmentation) models (on which, see FIELDS [2009]) informal
employment and output expand during recessions because formal employment,
which is rationed, falls, while the informal labour market clears. However, recent
research on Latin America suggests that on some measures informality may be
pro-cyclical (see, e.g., BOSCH AND MALONEY [2008]), and our analysis is
consistent with this view. In both Figure 2 and Figure 4 there are stretches of
qFs (p) + q
I
s(p) that are steeper than q
F
s (p) and stretches that are atter, at a given
price. In either gure, a small vertical deviation in demand can, depending on the
initial level of demand, cause a smaller or a larger change in output in the presence
of informality than without it. In this sense informality can be a built-in stabilizer
or destabilizer.
6 Conclusion
Most of the theoretical literature on informality has focused on the labour market.
In this paper we analyse the impact of informality by focusing on the production
side, though the labour market still plays a key role. A simple stylized framework
is developed for analyzing the mix of formality and informality in an industry
with entrepreneurs of heterogeneous ability. The results are classied according
to whether the labour market is segmented or not, with, in each case assumptions
made on parameter values such that a formal-informal mix obtains at some level
of demand.
We nd that, both with and without segmentation, the existence of the option
of informality can a¤ect output in either direction. In each case, supply is all
formal at a high enough price, and there is a mix of formality and informality at
an intermediate price. However, when price is su¢ ciently low in the segmenta-
tion case all supply is formal, whereas at a su¢ ciently low price in the absence
of segmentation all supply is informal. These conclusions depend on there be-
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ing a su¢ ciently wide range of entrepreneurial abilities. There is one scenario in
which having the option of informality results in production when there would
otherwise be one; that is in the case of an unsegmented labour market when de-
mand is relatively low. However, in other circumstances, when the e¤ect on total
output (and consumer surplus) is positive, the impact on the prots of the most
able entrepreneurs is negative, and vice versa. We suggest that this implies an
intertemporal trade-o¤, for the prots of the most able entrepreneurs may be par-
ticularly important for investment and growth. Without segmentation, the e¤ect
on total employment of having the option of informality is weakly positive. With
segmentation this e¤ect may go in either direction, but when informality occurs
it involves some replacement of some good jobs with bad. Consistent with recent
empirical evidence which suggests that in unsegmented labour markets informality
may be destabilizing in some respects, we nd that informality may be stabilizing
or destabilizing, and this conclusion also applies to segmented labour markets.
These results are all obtained for given parameter values. We also consider
comparative statics briey. In particular, we nd that a reduction of the reg-
istration cost raises welfare. If, for example, this cost is reduced to zero, then,
without segmentation there would be no informality. If, however, segmentation is
viewed as a given, informality may not be not eliminated by a zero registration
cost (depending on the level of demand). Then, informality may be regarded in
a second-best light: as we have seen, it has costs and benets and, depending on
the welfare weights assigned to these outcomes, as well as on parameter values and
the level of demand, it may be welfare-enhancing.
In further research, the sensitivity of our results to the distribution of entrepre-
neurial abilities and to alternative denitions of informality might be considered.
Instead of assuming that only two sizes of rm are possible for any given entrepre-
neur, size choice could be endogenizied, in essence combining our approach with
that of RAUCH [1991]. Also, penalties for being caught operating informally
could be introduced into the model: depending on these, and on the probability
of discovery, entrepreneurs might risk expanding informal rms.
Appendix: Proofs
Proposition 1
Raising p from zero, (formal) entry rst occurs at p = pF (min). (b) For
p 2 [pF (min); p], there is formality for all   F (p), i.e., qFs (p) = 2G[F (p)],
so that qF 0s (p) > 0; but q
I
s(p) = 0. (c) For p 2 (p; p(max)], formality occurs
for all   (p), i.e., qFs (p) = 2G[(p)]. (c) splits into two with respect to
informality: for p 2 (p; pI(max)] informality occurs for all  2 ((p); I(p)], i.e.,
qIs(p) = G[
I(p)]   G[(p)], so that qFs (p) + qIs(p) = (2   1)G[(p)] + G[I(p)],
and qF 0s (p) + q
I0
s (p) > 0; for p 2 (pI(max); p(max)] informality occurs for all
 2 ((p); max], i.e., qIs(p) = G[max]   G[(p)], so that qFs (p) + qIs(p) = (2  
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1)G[(p)] + G[max], and qF 0s (p) + q
I0
s (p) > 0. (d) For p 2 [p(max);1) there is
formality for all : qFs (p) = 2. Q.E.D.
Corollary 1
For p 2 (pF (min); pF (max)], qFs (p) = 2G[F (p)]; using (8), dp=dqFs (p) =
(w+2s)=(2 1). For p 2 (p; p(max)], qFs (p) = 2G[(p)]; using (6), dp=dqFs (p) =
(w + s)=2.
(a) p 2 [0; pF (min)]: qIs(p) = qFs (p) = qFs (p) = 0.
(b) p 2 (pF (min); p]: qFs (p) = 2G[F (p)] = qFs (p). Thus, using (4), dp=dqFs (p) <
dp=dqFs (p).
(c) p 2 (p; p(max)]: for p 2 (p; pI(max)], qIs(p) = G[I(p)]   G[(p)]. Using
(6)-(7),
qFs (p) + q
I
s(p)   qFs (p) =
h
2( (2 1)p k c
w+2s
  p k (c+0)=2
w+s
) + p k 0
w
i
=2  x=2;
using (4), dx=dp = f2s[s   s^]=w + s + w + 2w(   1)g= (2s+ w) (s + w) >
0. Substituting p = p into qFs (p) + q
I
s(p)   qFs (p) = x=2 and using (5) and
(4), qFs (p
) + qIs(p
)   qFs (p) > 0. Hence, qFs (p) + qIs(p)   qFs (p) > 0. For
p 2 (pI(max); p(max)], qIs(p) = 1   G[(p)]. Using (6), dp=d[qFs (p) + qIs(p)] =
2(w + s)=(2   1)2. Using (4), dp=d[qFs (p) + qIs(p) > dp=dqFs (p). At X in Figure
2, qFs (p) = 2G[
F (p)] equals qFs (p) + q
I
s(p) = 2G[
(p)] + 1 G[(p)]. Thus, for
p = ~p, 2G[F (~p)] = (2   1)[(~p)] + 1.
(d) p 2 (p(max);1): qIs(p) = 0 and qFs (p) = qFs (p); so qIs(p) + qFs (p) = qFs (p).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 2
Let s = 0 and c > c^. Using (1)-(2), we obtain the prot loci in Figure 3.
(a) For p 2 [0; pI(min)], qIs(p) = qFs (p) = 0. (b) For p 2 (pI(min); p(min)],
there is informality   I(p), i.e., qIs(p) = G[I(p)], which is increasing in p;
but qFs (p) = 0. (c) For p 2 (p(min); p], qIs(p) = G[I(p)]  G[(p)] and qFs (p) =
2G[(p)]; hence, qF 0s (p) > 0 and, using (6) and (7) with s = 0, q
I0
s (p) < 0; but
qIs(p) + q
F
s (p) = (2   1)G[(p)] + G[I(p)], which is increasing in p. (d) For
p 2 (p; pF (max)], qFs (p) = 2G[(p)], which is increasing in p, but qIs(p) = 0; for
p 2 (pF (max);1), qFs (p) = 2 and qIs(p) = 0. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2
(a) p 2 [0; pI(min)]: qIs(p) = qFs (p) = qFs (p) = 0.
(b) p 2 (pI(min); p(min)]: qFs (p) = 0; qIs(p) = [I(p)    + ]=2 = [(p   k  
0)=w +]=2, so that dp=qIs(p) = dp=dqIs(p) = 2w. For p 2 [pI(min); pF (min)],
qFs (p) = 0; for p 2 (pF (min); p(min)], qFs (p) = 2G[F (p)] = [F (p)  + ]= =
f(2p   2k   c   0)=2w    + g=, so that dp=qFs (p) = w=2. Hence,
dp=dqIs(p) > dp=dq
F
s (p). Let l
F
d (p) be the labour demand corresponding to q
F
s (p):
lFd (p) = q
F
s (p)=. Solving l
I
d(p) =
lFd (p) for p 2 (pF (min); p(min)], we nd that
p = p(min). Therefore, in (b), lId(p) > l
F
d (p), except at p = p(min), where
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lId(p) =
lFd (p). Thus, q
I
s(p(min) < q
F
s (p(min)), and q
I
s(p(min) = q
F
s (p(min)) at
some price p = px 2 (pF (min); p(min)].
(c) p 2 (p(min); p]: qIs(p) = [I(p)   (p)]=2 = [c   0   2(   1)p]=2w
and qFs (p) = 2f(p)    + g=2 = f[(2   1)p   k   c]=w    + g=; thus,
dp=d[qIs(p) + q
F
s (p)] = w=(2
2  2+ 1). But, from (b), dp=qFs (p) = w=2; so for
 > 1, dp=qFs (p) > dp=d[q
I
s(p) + q
F
s (p)]. q
I
s(p) + q
F
s (p) < q
F
s (p), except at p = p
,
where qIs(p) = 0 and so q
I
s(p) + q
F
s (p) = q
F
s (p).
(d) and (e) p 2 (p;1): qIs(p) = 0 and qFs (p) = qFs (p); so qIs(p)+qFs (p) = qFs (p).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 3
Assume segmentation.
For p 2 (p; pI(max)], from Corollary 1, qFs (p) + qIs(p) > qFs (p). As labour
productivity is lower with informality, lFs (p) + l
I
s(p) >
lFs (p).
For p 2 (pI(max); p(max)], lFs (p) + lIs(p) = 2G[(p)] + fG[I(p)] G[(p)]g =
G[(p)]+G[I(p)], which is increasing in p. But for p 2 [pF (max)); p(max)], lFs (p)
is constant. Since lFs (p)+l
I
s(p) =
lFs (p) at p = p(max), for p 2 [pF (max)); p(max)),
lFs (p)+l
I
s(p) <
lFs (p). For p 2 (pI(max); pF (max)], d(lFs (p)+lIs(p))=dp = dfG[(p)]+
G[I(p)]g=dp = [(2   1)=(w + 2s) + 1=w]2 and dlFs (p)=dp = df2G[(p)]g=dp =
(2 1)=(w+2s). Therefore, dlFs (p)=dp d(lFs (p)+lIs(p))=dp = (s  s^)=w(w+2s)
> 0. So lFs (p) [lFs (p)+lIs(p)] rises through this range, starting negative and ending
positive. lFs (p)  [lFs (p) + lIs(p)] = 0 if p = ~pl, where ~pl solves G[(p)] +G[I(p)] =
2G[(p)], i.e., ~pl = [2( + k)s+ (   c)w]=2(s  s^).
Assume no segmentation.
For p 2 (pI(min); pF (min)], lId(p) > 0 = lFd (p).
For p 2 [pF (min); p(min)], from the proof of Corollary 2, lId(p) > lFd (p), except
at p = p(min), where lId(p) = l
F
d (p).
For p 2 (p(min); p], lId(p) = [I(p)   (p)]=2 = [c   0   2(   1)p]=2w
and lFd (p) = 2f(p)    + g=2 = f[(2   1)p   k   c]=w    + g=; thus,
dp=d[lId(p) + l
F
d (p)] = w=. But l
F
d (p) = 2G[
F (p)] = [F (p)    + ]= =
f(2p 2k c 0)=2w +g=, so that dp=dlFd (p) = w= = dp=d[lId(p)+lFd (p)].
Thus, since lId(p(min)) + l
F
d (p(min)) =
lFd (p(min)), l
I
d(p) + l
F
d (p) =
lFd (p) for all of
this p-range. Q.E.D.
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